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entry into an industry whereﬁrms shareacol-
lectivereputation. First,weshowthatfreeentry is 
not socially optimal; there is a need for 
regulation through the imposition of a minimum 
quality standard. Second, we argue that a 
minimum quality standardcan induce ﬁrms to 
enter the market. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, a minimum quality standardshould not 
alwaysbe consideredasa barrierto entry.  
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2.6 billion dollars export market. Using UPC 
scanner data, Schlenker andVillas-Boas (2007) 
show evidence of a drop in domestic beef 
sales as well.  
The literature points out that a collective 
reputation is at stake in food industries in which 
food operators sell speciality 
orregionalproducts(Winfreeand McCluskey, 
2005). This is particularly true when consumers 
cannot identify theproducerofa food product
and/or food items are not traceable. Collective 
reputation has two main characteristics. First, 
producers are hostage to each others’ 
behavior. Namely, an entire group of ﬁrms can 
lose consumer trust as a result of one ﬁrm’s 
lack of diligence. Second, collectivereputation 
inducespricepremiumsonthe market. There are 
many empirical evidence which show that a 
positive collective reputation is a good tool to 
signal quality and is correlated with price 
premiums (Quagrainie, Mc Cluskey and 
Loureiro, 2003). Price premiums work as 
incentives for food operators to join the group. 
When food operators sell generic 
products, consumers mainly base 
their choices on the reputation of 
the entire industry. For instance, 
following an outbreak of food poisoning, 
everyone along the contaminated item’s supply 
chain may suffer the consequences of a 
decrease in demand. The problem arises when 
consumers do not link the contamination to a 
particular producer but to a generic product. 
After the Fall 2006 spinach outbreak, the 
Economic Research Service of the United 
States Department of Agriculture reported that 
all US spinach growers suffered a drop in 
demand for their product even though only one 
grower’s spinach was contaminated. Five 
months later, the value of retail sales was still 
down 27% compared to the same period in 
2005 (Calvin, 2007). In another example from 
1997, more than 200 people contracted 
hepatitisA after eating frozen strawberries. The 
USDA reported that concerns over the safety 
of strawberries affected demand for all berries. 
Experts estimated that the US berries industry 
bore losses of between $15 million and $40 
million dollars due to the outbreak (Calvin, 
Avendaño and Schwentesius, 2004). In 2003, 
following the discovery of the ﬁrst cow infected 
by Bovine Spongi 
I. INTRODUCTION  
form Encephalopathy in the USA, more than 30 
countries banned US beef, threatening the  
There is little formal discussion in the liter-
atureabout collectivereputation.Tirole (1996) 
considers that collective reputation should be 
assumed to be the aggregate reputation of 
individual agents. In a context of imperfect 
information available to consumers about 
quality, he shows that the composition of the 
producer group matters. Winfree and Mc 
Cluskey (2005) assume that collective reputa-
tionisa commonpropertyresourceand show that 
the number of ﬁrms should be considered 
closely because of free-rider effects. However, 
neither study allows for entry in or exit from the 
group of producers whose size is taken as 
ﬁxed.  
The current article addresses the issue of free-
entry when food operators share a collective 
reputation (the industry reputation)  II. OLIGOPOLY WITH COLLEC-
TIVE REPUTATION  
in a context of imperfect information about 
product safety available to consumers. We 
show that free entry is not socially optimal due 
to the producers’ incentive to free-ride on the 
collective reputation. This statement supports 
the introduction of a minimum quality (safety) 
standard, that could be considered as a 
Mimimun Quality Standard (MQS) to correct 
this market failure. In the industrial organization 
literature, there is a controversial debate 
regarding the effect of a MQS on competition. 
Ronnen (1991) show that an adequate MQS 
can increase both quantities sold and quality 
and then social welfare. The intuition of this 
result is that an increase in the low quality 
induces an increase of the high quality (in 
order to soften price competition) but 
equilibrium prices are however lower and more 
consummers buy the product (see also 
Crampes and Hollander for a similar result). 
The robustness of this result has been ques-
tionned in few direction. Valetti (2000) shows 
that this statement is sensitive to the mode of 
competition and Scarpa (1998) shows that it 
depends on the duopolistic market structure. 
As Ronnen (1991) and Crampes and Hollander 
(1995) acknowledge, they do not consider the 
possibility of exit and/ or entry. As also 
underlined in Boccard and Wauthy (2004), who 
study quality regulation through quantity 
regulation, MQS would induce ﬁrm to exit the 
market and/or reduce the entry of new ﬁrms. 
The article proceeds as follows. In the light of 
empirical evidence, we set up the theoretical 
model emphasizing the free entry issue. Next, 
we analyze the competition ef-
fectswhenaMQSisimposedonthe industry. 
Finally, we provide our conclusions and their 
policy implications.  
We consider an industry in which identical and risk 
neutral food operators sell generic products. In this 
case, if a quality failure occurs the collective 
reputation at stake is the reputationof the entire 
industry.We consider a two-stage game: in the ﬁrst 
stage, proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms choose whether or not 
to enter the market. Whena ﬁrmenters the market, it 
faces a ﬁxed (sunk) cost '$ $. In the second stage, 
the ﬁrm makes a quality decision in order to avoid 
quality failure, thereby contributingtothe 
collectivereputationofthe industry. Once they have 
entered the market and paid the sunk cost ', ﬁrms 
face a cost &!!" of providing quality with &
$ 
$ $ and  
&
$$  $ $. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) analyzea 
situationin which ﬁrmsproduceanhomogeneous 
product and the output per ﬁrm (strictly) 
decreases with the number of ﬁrms. Since we 
focus on the role of collective reputation, in our 
setting each ﬁrm produces one unit of the 
product.  
Consumers only are able to imperfectly ob-
serve the average quality 2%  of the product 
marketed.Wethus assume that thereputation of 





" $. The inverse demand 
function is then ) !1"(with )
$ 
# $). The industry 
reputation is "bad" with probability % *!2% " and 
consequently demand drops to $. Therefore, 
the expected proﬁt of a generic ﬁrm 0is ( '*!2% ") 
!1"&!2("'. We solve the game through 
backwardinduction. In the next section, we ﬁrst 
present two reasonable assumptions from the 
monopolistic case.We then examine the 
oligopoly situation.  A. Monopolist Processor   for a ﬁrm 0 is then (-4 *!2% ") !1"&!2( ",  
+# % ! +#  
We start our analysis by considering the case 
where there is only one ﬁrm in the market. In the 
second stage,the monopolistic ﬁrm makes a 
quality decision 2 in order to maximize its proﬁt; 
(-4 *!2")#  &!2"" where )# '  
where 2% ' 
#$! 







!2(". It deﬁnes ﬁrm 0
$
s best   *  
response as an implicit function of the average 
quality level 2%  and the number of ﬁrms 1. 
Hence, each ﬁrm has an incentive to decrease 
its quality if the average quality increases.  
In an interior equilibrium, the ﬁrms’ quality 
decisions are all the same, i.e. for all 0, 2( ' 2
! 
!1"which is characterized by:  
+  
) !%". The corresponding ﬁrst order condition is 
as follows *
$ 
!2# ")# ' &
$ 
!2# ". In the ﬁrst stage, 
the monopoly payoff is given by !2# "%" ' *!2# 
")#  &!2#  "'. Let consider the two following 
assumptions:  
Assumption 1: ' " *!2# ")# &!2# "!  
Assumption 2: ,+-!2"%"" $!  
+#$%  
Assumption1states thata ﬁrm always enters the 
market when it foresees that no other ﬁrm 
would do so. According to assumption 2, a 
monopolistic ﬁrm cannot make any proﬁt when 
its investment in quality reaches a certain level. 
All through the article, we assume that 
Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold. We now 
analyze the situation where more than one ﬁrm 
enter the market.  
B. Oligopolist Processor  
Proceeding with our analysis, we consider that 
1 identical ﬁrms enter the market. These 
ﬁrmsproduceahomogeneousgoodandshare a 
collectivereputation. Accordingtothe latter 
statement, the entire industry can fail if one 
ﬁrm misbehaves (Winfree and Mc Cluskey, 
2005; Carriquiry and Babcock, 2007). First, we 
consider that ﬁrms make their quality decision, 
taking the decisions of the others as given. 
Second, we examine the welfare effects of 
competition.  
This expression has a negative value. In 
!"   & 
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  deed, )
$ 
# $, then )
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) !1"$ $.  *  
We distinguish two effects. On the one hand, 
when the number of ﬁrms in the market 
increases, the ﬁrms’ incentive to provide quality 
decreases. This effect is identical to the 
ﬁndings of Winfree and Mc Cluskey (2005). On 
the other hand, competition strengthens and 
the price of the product consequently de-
creases.Aﬁrm’s beneﬁts are thus diluted and 
each ﬁrmprovidesa lower levelof quality.  
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms decide to enter the 
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(3) ! "  
$%  
In the second-stage, ﬁrms individually make 
their quality decision, 2(, in order to prevent a 
drop in demand. The second-stage problem  















represents the non cooperative equilibrium 
quality level.  
Proposition 1 An increase in the number of 







Proof. Differentiating condition1 withrespect to 
1we obtain  tive. The number of ﬁrms who enter the market 














denotes the equilibrium number of 
ﬁrms, which is an implicit function of ', the sunk 
costs of entry.  







































" # $ and according to Proposition 1, 
!+! 
# $. Then, 
!*! 
# $. Conse  !* !"  
quently, the size of the industry decreases as 
the entry cost increases.  
With these results in hand, we turn to the 
welfare effect of competition.  
The ambiguous welfare effect  
In order to appraise the welfare effect of a 
change in the number of ﬁrms, we consider the 
ﬁrst stage equilibrium.  
If 1 ﬁrms enter the market, they anticipate that 
they will implement the non cooperative 
equilibrium quality level 2
! 
in the second stage. 
Under the assumption of quasi-linear 
consumer utility, the consumer’s surplus 
Proposition 2 Free entry is not socially optimal.  
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"1"represents the ﬁrst stage equilibrium proﬁt 
per ﬁrm. The social welfare is denoted by , ' , 
!2
!
"1", with , !2
!
"1" such that:  
Proof.  We evaluate the marginal variation of 
welfare at the free entry point. Differentiating 
condition 5 with respect to the number of ﬁrms 1" 
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%  
this expression hasa strict negative value.  
Numerical example: We consider the following 
speciﬁcation of the model. The collective 
reputation is characterized by a logit function of 
the average quality, 2%: *!2% "'  
%  
(5)  








We can now evaluate the welfare effect of 




  respect to 1, we obtain
'$ 
# .  '* !* !+ !*  
The welfare effect is twofold. The direct effect 






"#').  *!2") !+ !$  
As long as proﬁts remain non negative,   !+  
has a positive value. This represents the clas-
sical positive effect of competition. The in 
!$ !+
!
  direct effect is given by . According   !+ !*  
to Proposition 1, the average quality on the 
market decreases with respect to the num 
!+
!
  ber of ﬁrms, 
!* # $. The welfare effect !$  
of an increase in quality, , is given by   !+ *! 
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  Therefore, the indirect welfare effect   !+ !*  
hasa negative value.  
When food operators share a collective rep-
utation, the welfare effect of competition is 
ambiguous. An increase in the number of ﬁrms 
reduces each ﬁrm’s market power and prices, 
thereby improving social welfare. Yet at the 
same time, it lowers the average quality on the 
market, reducing social welfare.  +"  
&$+" . The inverse demand function is assumed to 
be linear, ) !1"' 1where $ $. The cost 
functiontoprovide qualityis &!2("'  
industry increases. In our model, we assume 
that the output per ﬁrm is constant, however, 
thefree-riding incentiveson collectivereputation 
lead us to the same conclusion.   &  
!%#2(" 
' 
. The individual ex ante proﬁt   '  
function can be written as !2
! 
!1""1"'   Minimum Quality Standard is the most  
!  +
 
commonly usedregulatory toolinthe foodin 




.   Con  ! 
%
"  "  # &   * ' *  &  %   ! 1"     # !  #
%  ! 
% "  
surplus is given by &+!2! !1""1"' (Marette, 2007). In the next section, we exam 
ine the competition effects when a minimum  
quality standardis introduced by the regula 
tor.  
sumer  
!  # ! 
%
"   %   &
* "   Therefore, the social welfare  
!  #    
'  
! 
% "  
!  #   ! 
%
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+     
, 
biguous welfare effects of competition.  
#'  . Figure1represents the am  * ' * &  
"  
#     1  
% 
. 
III. MINIMUM QUALITY STAN 
DARD  
While maintaining our focus on the entry issue, 
we examine the situation where theregulator 
imposes a Minimum Quality Standard.  
 
A. Magnitude of the MQS  
First, we characterize a particular quality 
choice, 2&, which is the cooperative equilibrium 
quality in the second stage. This level is the 
solution of (-4 *!2") !1"  &!2",  
+"% 




!2& "'$. Note that 2& represents the 
optimal quality level for the industry.   Figure 1. The Welfare Effects of Competition  
When 1
! 
ﬁrms compete in the market, the 
positive welfare effect of competition disap-
pears. Therefore, the regulator needs to inter-
vene in order to avoid free-riding incentives 
and to prevent the entire industry from failing to 
perform. This result contributes to the critical 
debate in the industrial organization literature 
concerning the justiﬁcation of anti-
competitiveregulation. For instance, Mankiw 
and Whinston (1986) have shown that in ho-
mogeneous product markets, free entry can 
lead to a socially excessive number of ﬁrms. 
They model a situation in which the output per 
ﬁrm falls as the number of ﬁrms in the  
Second, we assume that the regulator imposes 
a MQS denoted by 2,. 2,  is exogenous and 
common knowledge. Firms make their entry 
and quality decisions according to the 
magnitude of 2,. Food operators are orderedto 







"denote the non cooperative subgame 
perfect equilibrium quality level.  
Proposition 3 If 2, " 2
!!
, the MQS has no effect 





# 2& such that for 2
!! 
" 2, " 2
$ 
, 
the number of ﬁrms is higher than 1
! 
and for  2, # 2
$
, the number of ﬁrms is lower than 1
!
. 
The number of ﬁrms is maximal for 2, '2&.  
market. 
Proof.  When the MQS is lower than the 
equilibrium non cooperative quality level 2, " 2
!!
, 
ﬁrms implement the (non cooperative) subgame 
perfect equilibrium quality level 2
!! 
and the 
number of ﬁrms in the market remains 1
! 
. When 
the MQS is higher than the (non cooperative) 
subgame perfect equilibrium quality level 2, # 2
!!
, 
let 1) denote the number of ﬁrms who enter the 
market. It is characterized by !2, "1) "' *!2, ") !1) "
&!2, " ' '$. Differentiating the latter condition with 
respect to MQS  
For MQS levels higher than the cooperative 
level, the marginal cost of providing quality 
overcomes the marginal beneﬁt, leading to a 
drop in proﬁts. Consequently, the MQS alters 
competition and less ﬁrms enter the market. 
The number of ﬁrms remains higher than it
would under free entry as low as the MQS is 
low enough (up to 2
$
). For higher MQS levels, 
the number of ﬁrms becomes less than the 
number of ﬁrms at the free entry point. This is 
the only situation in which the MQS can alte
 
r 
competition. Figure2illustrates theseresults.  
 









-. -.  
! '*$ !  
!*$ # $. Then, 30/1 ' 30/1 . 
'+' !+'  
The number of ﬁrms 1) increases when 2
! 
" 2, " 
2& and decreases when the MQS level is 
higher than the cooperative equilibrium quality 
level 2&. By assumption, )
$ 
# $ and !2, "1" " !2, 
"%". Consequently, ,+  + #$%  
$  
!2, "1"" ,+-!2, "%". From Assumption  
+ #$%  
$  
2(monopolist case), we conclude that ,+ 
Figure 2. Number of Firms and MQS.   + #$%  
$  
!2, "%" " ,+-!2, "1)"'$. Finally,  
In the light of these statements, we turn now to 
analyze the welfare effect after a MQS has 
been imposed.  
+ #$%  
,+-1) " 
$ 




$  $%  
which satisﬁes the conditions set in the propo-
sition (see Figure 2).  
If the MQS is sufﬁciently low, it does not in-
ﬂuence either competition or the ﬁrm’s quality 
choice. Increasing the level of the MQS raises 
the level of the collective reputation by 
increasing ﬁrms’ quality level. The MQS does 
not alter competition and induces ﬁrms to enter 
the market as long as the cost of providing the 
MQS level is sufﬁciently low. At the cooperative 
equilibrium quality level !2& ", the collective 
reputation and the total proﬁt are maximal. 
When the MQS is imposed at such a level,a 
maximum numberof ﬁrms enter the  
B. Welfare effect of the MQS  
Let consider the welfare function at the free 
entry point when there are 1
! 
ﬁrms in the in-
dustry who have implemented the non coop 
2



















" . At the  
%  
free entry point, if the MQS is such that  
2
!! 
" 2, " 2
$ 
, 1, ﬁrms operate in the industry and the 
welfare is given by  $%  *(' 




" " *!2, ". Therefore, aver 
age quality is higher once a MQS has been 
introduced. The MQS increases competition, 
there are more ﬁrms in the industry !1
! 
" 1, " 
which increases consumers’  
*!  ( 




" "  
%   *
(' 
)!3".31,)!1, ". Relative to free entry, the  
%  
introduction of a MQS improves welfare as 
long as the level of the MQS leads to a greater 
number of active ﬁrms. This result differs from 
previous conclusions on minimum quality 
standards and collective reputation. Winfree 
and Mc Cluskey (2005) argue that when ﬁrms 
share a collective reputation, the introduction of 
MQS limits incentives to free-ride. The 
minimum quality standard is then Pareto 
improving for ﬁrms but they do not take into 
account a competition effect.   Acknowledgments  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS  
The issue of collective reputation is 
not exclusive to ﬁrms who sell regional or 
specialty products. Collective reputation may 
be at stake when food operators sell food items 
that consumers consider as generic. For 
instance, an entire industry may suffer 
decreased demand following a food safety 
outbreak. In order to prevent quality and safety 
failures, food operators endeavour to sustain 
an accurate level of quality in the market. 
However, the more ﬁrms there are in the 
industry, the greater the incentive to free-ride 
on the qualityof others.We show thatfree-entry 
leadsto a sub-optimal number of ﬁrms in the 
market. Therefore, the regulator needs to 
intervene in order to avoid the incentive to free-
ride and to prevent the entire industry from 
failing to perform. A solution could be to restrict 
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